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Abstract
We analyze the longevity of foreign entrants explicitly considering two possible ways of
exit: ﬁrm closure and capital divestiture. We ﬁnd that entry and post-entry strategies aﬀect
the longevity of ﬁrms and of foreign equity holdings, but in diﬀerent manners. While the
ownership arrangements and organizational structure aﬀect the likelihood of divestment, they
exert no signiﬁcant eﬀect upon closure. The entry mode exerts opposite eﬀects on the two
modes of exit, greenﬁeld entrants being more likely to shutdown, but less likely to be divested.
Only human capital aﬀects closure and divestment in the same manner. Firms with large
endowments of human capital are less likely to exit, irrespective of the exit mode considered.
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In one of the few studies which has analyzed exit of foreign entrants, Li (1995) convincingly
showed that the longevity of foreign presence depends on the strategic choices at entry, namely
the choice between starting a new company and acquiring an existing one and the choice between
running a joint venture and running a fully-owned business.
This workextends previous research by studying the survival of foreign entrants while recog-
nizing that there are also diﬀerent ways of exiting from foreign markets. Exit may occur through
liquidation of the subsidiary ﬁrm or simply through divestiture. The two processes are likely to
be governed by diﬀerent forces and understanding the reasons that determine each of them is
important to improving our knowledge of the process of international expansion. The analysis
is conducted with reference to over 1000 foreign-owned ﬁrms that started operating in Portugal
during the period 1983-1989.
The topic is not of mere academic interest, and should attract considerable attention from
the practitioners as well. Managers considering going into international markets are interested in
evaluating the chances of their success. Since the two alternative modes of exit may be determined
by diﬀerent forces, managers should beneﬁt from knowing under which circumstances each type
of exit is more likely to occur.
The plan is as follows. First, we present the hypotheses to be tested. The following section
discusses methodological issues, including the description of the data source, the methods used in
computing the variables, and the statistical methodology employed. Next, we give an overview of
the sample characteristics and exit patterns, followed by the presentation of the results. Finally,
in the last section we discuss the contribution of the study and oﬀer concluding comments.
Hypotheses
The frameworkemployed in the analysis is the following. In each period, foreign subsidiaries
confront two risks, the risk of closure and that of divestiture, which are assumed here to be
independent. In each period, therefore, three outcomes are possible. The ﬁrm may continue
its operations under foreign ownership, it may be divested or it may close. These outcomes are
produced by two separate decisions, represented in Figure 1. One is the decision to divest or
not to divest. The other is decision to shutdown or not to shutdown. The common theme of
the hypotheses developed below is that the strategies followed by foreign entrants may exert
disparate eﬀects upon the two decisions.
insert Figure 1 about here
Entry mode
One of the crucial decisions when deciding to expand into a new market is the decision on
whether to set up a new venture or to acquire an existing ﬁrm (Yip 1982, Zejan 1990, Woodcock,
Beamish and Makimo 1994). In a recent paper, Shaver (1998) suggested that the choice of entry
mode may be endogenous, being determined by the ﬁrm’s prospects of failure. While we do not
1investigate the endogeneity issue, we acknowledge that the choice of entry mode may have diﬀerent
eﬀects upon the probabilities of closure and divestment. The diﬀerent patterns of dissolution and
divestiture experienced by start-ups and diversifying entrants have been investigated by Mitchell
(1994), but this has not been studied in the context of foreign entry.
The theory of the multinational corporation emphasizes that the possession of ownership
advantages is a key factor in explaining why ﬁrms do business abroad, despite the increased costs
they incur due to their poorer knowledge of the local conditions (Dunning 1993). The choice of
the entry method is largely determined by the nature and extent of these ownership advantages.
Acquisition may be the preferred method of entry when the acquired ﬁrm possesses some intrinsic
advantage such as location, and the advantage of the acquiring ﬁrm rests elsewhere than in
production technology, for example in marketing. However, if the advantage of the multinational
ﬁrm rests on the superiority of its production-speciﬁc assets, for example, because it has access to
a proprietory technology, it may not be easy to ﬁnd an ongoing business suitable for acquisition,
and starting a new company from scratch may be the best alternative.
To the extent that acquisition signals the predominance of non-speciﬁc assets while greenﬁeld
entry indicates the need to develop a tailored production facility, we would expect that ﬁrms
that had been once acquired would be more suitable to other potential buyers. Also, if a foreign
ﬁrm entered by greenﬁeld because it owns some proprietory technology, it is very unlikely that it
wants to let others use its technology. Therefore, we would expect acquisition entrants to be more
likely to be resold than ﬁrms that have been created from scratch. Thus, our ﬁrst hypothesis is
formulated as follows (where the letters D and C after the hypothesis number indicate that the
hypothesis refers to divestiture and closure, respectively).
Hypothesis 1D) Foreign ﬁrms entering by acquisition are more likely to divest from
their subsidiaries than are those entering through greenﬁeld entry.
Furthermore, studies on multinational ﬁrms have generally found that, although new ventures
promise a higher rate of return, their proﬁts are more variable than those from acquisitions
(Caves 1996). The reason why proﬁts from acquisitions are less risky is that those ﬁrms which
are acquired have already gone into a process of developing procedures and routines that enable
them to deal eﬀectively with their environment (Hannan and Carroll 1992). They are, therefore,
typically less subject than new ventures to those unforeseen contingencies that may lead to the
closure of the productive facility. This leads us to hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1C) Foreign ﬁrms entering by acquisition are less likely to be shutdown
than are those entering through greenﬁeld entry.
Ownership advantages
Ownership advantages are typically associated with the ability of ﬁrms to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc
assets, which cannot be imitated by competitors and provide the basis for their competitive
advantage (Wernerfelt 1984). Firms with such assets are normally those which conduct R&D
activities, spend considerably on advertising, and possess large amounts of human capital. Recent
studies on entry, post-entry penetration and survival show that the ability to develop and exploit
such assets is crucial for the post-entry performance of ﬁrms (Burgelman 1994, Bogner, Thomas
and McGee 1996, Chang 1996). We thus expect that ﬁrms using larger amounts of human capital
will experience higher chances of success in operating in a foreign country. Because human capital
2is directly related to the extent of the ﬁrm’s ownership advantages, we expect it to be inﬂuential
in the ﬁrm’s decision to leave the foreign country, regardless of the mode of exit. Therefore, we
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2C) New ﬁrms with a larger human capital endowment experience a lower
probability of closure.
Hypothesis 2D) New ﬁrms with a larger human capital endowment experience a lower
probability of divestment.
Ownership structure
Joint ventures Transaction costs theory contends that joint ventures are a response to failures
in markets for particular assets held by diﬀerent companies. A good example of such assets in
the context of multinational investment is tacit knowledge about technology from the potential
foreign investor and about the host country from the local partner. The market failure emerges
because local ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to acquire knowledge about the unspeciﬁed details of the
technology and foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to buy knowledge about the modus operandi of local
markets. It thus becomes cheaper for the parties to share both assets through a common endeavor
than to trade them through the market. On the other hand, joint ventures also have costs. By
making both parties residual claimants on ﬁrm’s proﬁts, they create in both parties incentives to
free-ride, which makes these ventures highly unstable.
This instability of joint ventures has been widely recognized in the literature. As the co-
operative venture ages, and ﬁrms learn about the other party’s assets, the beneﬁts of joint
ventures are often oﬀset by their costs and the likelihood of joint venture dissolution increases.
For example, Hennart (1991) found that Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. are less likely to
be joint ventures, the greater the age of the subsidiary. Kogut (1989) observed that in some
circumstances ﬁrms may be able to develop strategies to reduce the likelihood of dissolution. He
observed that partner ﬁrms which had established several simultaneous co-operative agreements,
thereby increasing the punishment cost of breaking any particular agreement, were signiﬁcantly
less likely to dissolve a joint venture, than those which had a single common venture. As a
consequence of this greater instability, Yamawaki (1997) found that fully-owned subsidiaries of
Japanese multinationals were less likely to exit than joint ventures. This leads us directly to our
next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3D) Fully-owned subsidiaries are less likely to be divested than joint-
ventures.
Minority holdings Joint ventures diﬀer with respect to the degree of control exerted by the
foreign party. Although the foreign share can vary in a continuous scale between 0 and 100, two
thresholds are of particular importance. The ﬁrst threshold distinguishes portfolio investments
from joint ventures in a narrow sense. The second distinguishes majority from minority joint
ventures. The distinction between portfolio investments and joint ventures is important because
portfolio investments typically do not confer controlling rights. In this study, we are not concerned
with this type of investments and will not include ﬁrms with such type of foreign ownership
(foreign equity below 10%) in our sample.
3We are, however, interested in the distinction between minority joint-venture, in which foreign
ﬁrms have some degree of control rights, and joint ventures in which foreign ﬁrms have the
majority of the votes. Minority holdings are a risky strategy, since control escapes to the foreign
ﬁrm, and it may be subject to opportunistic behavior. In fact, the literature comparing the
choice of multinationals with respect to the type of control they possess over their subsidiaries
has found that the propensity to hold minority stakes in the subsidiary increases with the size
of the parent ﬁrm (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Blomstrom and Zejan 1989) and with its
degree of diversiﬁcation (Alzona, Rondi and Vitali 1993, Blomstrom and Zejan 1989). These
ﬁndings have been interpreted as a consequence of the greater willingness of large parent ﬁrms
to take risks abroad. Moreover, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) found that the degree of control
over subsidiaries varies positively with the intensity of R&D and advertising expenditures. This
suggests that minority positions are less likely to be held when asset speciﬁcity is important and
entry involves a strong commitment to the market.
These arguments lead naturally to our next hypothesis, which posits that
Hypothesis 4D) Minority holdings are more likely to be divested than are majority
holdings.
Legal Form The reason why there are several legal forms under which ﬁrms can operate is
to allow for diﬀerent limitations on the degree of liability incurred by ﬁrms’ owners. While in
unlimited liability ﬁrms the owners are personally accountable for the ﬁrm’s debts, the liability
of the owners of a limited liability ﬁrm is restricted to the value of their equity in the company.
Because the liability of ﬁrms is reduced with increases in the degree of complexity of the legal
form, the requirements in terms of organization and formalization of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reports
also increase. There are also minimum requirements to form a limited liability ﬁrm (amount
of equity capital, number of equity owners) which do not apply to unlimited liability venture.
Thus, limited liability companies involve signiﬁcantly higher set-up and ﬁxed operating costs
than do unlimited liability ﬁrms. On the other hand, the transaction of one’s stake in the ﬁrm is
easier for limited liability ﬁrms than for their unlimited liability counterparts. For example, only
limited liability ﬁrms can go public and have their shares publicly traded, while the ownership
of unlimited liability ﬁrms can be changed only with the explicit agreement of all owners.
Legal form may thus have an opposite eﬀect on divestment and closure. The more limited
the liability of ﬁrms, the easier is the transfer of propriety rights and thus, holding everything
else constant, the more likely the ﬁrm is to be divested. On the contrary, the more limited the
liability of ﬁrms, the less likely it is that they will be shut down. On the one hand, given their
higher set-up costs, they have a higher option value in waiting and are likely to remain open
longer than ﬁrms with lower set-up costs (Dixit and Pindyck1994). On the other hand, because
the personal responsibility of the owners decreases with liability, the owners of unlimited liability
ﬁrms are likely to be more conservative with respect to exit decisions than the owners of limited
liability ﬁrms. Therefore, they will exit before the moment where a similar decision would be
taken by the limited liability ﬁrms, who have less to lose in case of bankruptcy. The eﬀect of
the choice of legal ﬁrm on the survival of ﬁrms has been examined by Br¨ udel, Presiend¨ orfer and
Ziegler (1992) and Harhoﬀ, Stahl and Woywode (1996), who found the company legal form to
be associated with the chances of success. Harhoﬀ, Stahl and Woywode (1996), in particular,
found that limited liability companies are more prone to insolvencies, but less likely to undergo
voluntary liquidation, than are other companies.
Thus, we will test the following hypotheses.
4Hypothesis 5C) The likelihood of closure decreases with the limitation of liability.
Hypothesis 5D) The likelihood of divestment increases with the limitation of liability.
Control Variables
Other variables need to be taken into account in our empirical analysis. At the ﬁrm level, we
include size, growth, the extent of diversiﬁcation and of multiplant operations.
Many studies have found a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and the probability of
survival (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989, Mitchell 1994, Mata, Portugal and Guimar˜ aes
1995). This has been rationalized as resulting from ﬁrms having a high degree of uncertainty
about their own capabilities when they start (Jovanovic 1982). Because of the irreversibility
inherent to most investments, it is optimal for ﬁrms to start at a small scale and grow only if
they ﬁnd that they have been successful in the past (Cabral 1995). A second reason why ﬁrms
may start small and expand afterwards is because their entry size is partially determined by
cash constraints. Firms which are not part of a large multinational organization, where cash
constraints are less important, may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to raise enough money to ﬁnance entry at
their most preferred scale (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). Therefore, large ﬁrms less likely to exit
than their small counterparts. The relationship between size and the likelihood of divestiture is
less obvious and the empirical studies that have analyzed exit by divestment have not found any
signiﬁcant relationship between divestment and the size of ﬁrms (Schary 1991, Mitchell 1994).
Most studies that have analyzed the impact of foreign ﬁrm diversiﬁcation upon exit have
examined primarily the proximity between the parent ﬁrm and the subsidiary main activities.
These studies have found that unrelated subsidiaries are more likely to exit than subsidiaries
operating in the same activity as the parent ﬁrm (Li 1995, Yamawaki 1997). To our knowledge,
only Bane and Neubauer (1981) have looked at the eﬀect of subsidiary’s internal diversiﬁcation,
ﬁnding that narrowly focused branches experienced a lower failure rate than did more diversiﬁed
ones. This result can be due to the fact that specialized ﬁrms experience a greater degree
of commitment to their activity and management is less dispersed. On the other hand, the
number of plants operated by the ﬁrm was found to have a positive impact on ﬁrms’ prospects of
survival by Mata and Portugal (1994). This result can be rationalized by noting that multiplant
ﬁrms can accommodate the failure of one of their plants without failing themselves, while single
plant ﬁrms cannot. To the extent that this argument depends on the correlation between the
success of diﬀerent business units in a ﬁrm, it also applies to the extent of diversiﬁcation. We will
accommodate these two aspects in our empirical analysis, without making any speciﬁc predictions
about the relationships.
Furthermore, the environment in which entry occurs is also likely to aﬀect the survival
prospects of the ﬁrm. We will use a number of industry characteristics to control for the diﬀerent
environments in which ﬁrms operate.
The ﬁrst of such variables is the degree of industry concentration. Based on an Industrial
Organization argument, the degree of competition in the market has been hypothesized to increase
the likelihood of survival. The argument here is that concentration facilitates collusion among
incumbents and hence aggressive responses to entry. Market concentration has been found to
negatively aﬀect the chances of survival of new ﬁrms by Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), but
it has been found to be insigniﬁcant by Romanelli (1989) and by Mata and Portugal (1994).
Focusing on foreign ﬁrms, Li (1995) and Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung (1994) found a positive
eﬀect of concentration on new ﬁrm survival, although this eﬀect was barely signiﬁcant.
5We will also control for the entry and growth rates in the industry. Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1988) found that there is a strong positive cross-sectional correlation between entry
and exit, and this ﬁnding has been further corroborated by a number of scholars (see Cable and
Schwalbach 1991, for example). This has been explained in terms of symmetry between entry and
exit barriers by Eaton and Lipsey (1980), an hypothesis which received empirical conﬁrmation
by Shapiro (1983) in the context of multinational ﬁrms.
Industries which are growing quickly are likely to be environments in which the probability
of exit of new ﬁrms is lower. One of the stylized facts established by Schmalensee in his survey
of empirical workon Industrial Organization (1989 p. 972) is that proﬁts are in general larger in
growing than in otherwise identical industries. This makes survival easier, as new ﬁrms do not
have to attract costumers away from incumbents. Both Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) and
Mata and Portugal (1994) found a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of industry growth upon the
survival of new ﬁrms.
Survival is also likely to be correlated with the extent of economies of scale in the industry.
Firms which operate at a scale smaller than the minimum eﬃcient scale incur a cost disadvantage
vis ` a vis eﬃciently scaled ﬁrms. This cost disadvantage puts ﬁrms in a fragile position, as they
have to develop alternative competitive strategies that enable them to cope with competitive
pressures. Therefore, for a ﬁrm of a given size, the larger the extent of economies of scale in
an industry, the more likely it is that such ﬁrm is smaller than the minimum eﬃcient scale, and
thus will suﬀer a cost disadvantage. Everything else being identical, the chances of survival will
thus be higher in industries where economies of scale are not very important than in those where
they are signiﬁcant. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) present empirical evidence supporting this
hypothesis.
Finally, the survival of the new foreign owned ﬁrms is likely to be related to the previous
presence of foreign ﬁrms in the market. Shaver, Mitchell and Yeung (1997) found that foreign
presence mostly aﬀects the survival of foreign entrants if entrants are already operating in the
country, but in a diﬀerent industry than that in which entry is attempted. They argue that ﬁrms
which are already in the country are in the best position to beneﬁt from the learning spillovers
generated from foreign presence, and that those which do not possess direct information about
the industry will beneﬁt the most from these spillovers. We do not have information on previous
experience, and therefore, we will not be able to take this qualiﬁcation into account. As a
consequence, if such qualiﬁcation is indeed important, we will obtain weaker results than if we
could control for previous experience. In an earlier study, the same authors present evidence that
foreign presence aﬀects the survival of foreign entrants, but they argue that one should expect an
inverse U-relationship between foreign presence and survival (Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung 1994).
They claim that foreign survival at the earlier stages of foreign presence should be more diﬃcult
due to lackof mark et k nowledge, while at the latter stages it should again be more diﬃcult due
to congestion eﬀects. This argument is developed in a time-series context, in which the same
market is observed over time. In our case, we have essentially a cross-section variation. We
thus expect previous foreign presence to signal the presence of those characteristics which make
foreign survival more likely.
6Methods
Data
Our data were obtained from a survey conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment
(Quadros de Pessoal hereafter QP). This is a comprehensive survey covering all ﬁrms with wage
earners in Portugal, which has been conducted every year since 1982. Moreover, its longitudinal
capacity, i. e. ﬁrms are identiﬁed through a unique number, allows ﬁrms to be followed over
time. What makes this data source really unique and particularly valuable from the point of
view of the analysis of foreign entry and exit is that, among other data, the survey records the
share of equity held by non-residents. Taken together with its longitudinal characteristic, this
allows us to compute measures of entry of foreign capital and to establish the longevity of these
investments in Portugal.
We identiﬁed changes in foreign capital participation with a three step procedure. First, we
identiﬁed all ﬁrms which held foreign capital in at least one year from 1983 to 1989 and which
did not have foreign capital in the previous year. This enabled us to date the moment of entry
of foreign capital. Second, we searched for the existence of the ﬁrm itself in the year before
entry in order to be able to classify foreign entry as acquisition versus greenﬁeld. This could be
easily done because ﬁrms’ identiﬁers are numbers supplied sequentially when ﬁrms ﬁrst report
to the survey. Identiﬁcation of new ﬁrms can thus be achieved by comparing ﬁrms’ identiﬁers
with the highest identiﬁcation number in the ﬁle in the previous year. Finally, the last step
was the establishment of the life span of foreign capital. For this we had to be able to identify
the moment in which the foreign participation ceased. As previously discussed we are interested
in distinguishing two alternatives: foreign ﬁrm closure, where the foreign owned ﬁrm ceases its
operations, and foreign capital divestiture, where the ﬁrm continues to operate, but no longer
with foreign capital participation. To identify the moment of divestiture we searched for the ﬁrst
year when the ﬁrm reported foreign participation below 10%, while for identifying closure we
searched for the moment when the ﬁrm ceased to report to the survey.
The database has limitations that should be made clear. First, we do not know the identity
of the foreign owners. This is unfortunate because it prevents us from using the parents’ char-
acteristics to explain the exit of subsidiaries, and because we are not able to identify the sale
of a foreign equity participation by one foreign ﬁrm to another. Another potential limitation
of our data set is that we cannot tell mergers from true exits. What typically happens when
one of such movements occurs is that one of the identiﬁers of the ﬁrms involved in the merger
is transmitted to the resulting ﬁrm, while the others disappear, and are counted as exits in our
data. Furthermore, with such a large database, one can never be sure that no coding errors are
made.
We tookspecial care to minimize the number of false foreign entries and exits that were
included in our sample. In the sake of economy, we do not describe here all the procedures
employed to checkthe reliability of the data base, which consisted in comparing our data with
data from other sources and in double checking the moment of exit. In summary, we were able
to conclude that the measurement of the entry and exit ﬂows is quite reliable, and that mergers
and changes in ownership due to simultaneous investment and divestment by foreign owners are
not signiﬁcant. The details of all the procedures employed to perform these checks are described
in a methodology appendix, which is available from the authors upon request.
7Statistical Model
The key concept in duration analysis is the hazard rate, that gives the probability that a unit
exits within a particular time interval, given that it survived until then. In our context, we will
workwith two distinct hazard rates, corresponding to the two types of exit we are interested
in. Rather than imposing a parametric functional form for the hazard function, a simple ﬂexible
hazard model (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980) was employed
h(m)=λm m =1 ,2,...,M 0 <λ m < 1,
where λm is just the hazard rate for the time interval m. Thus, the sequence from λ1 to λM
exhibits the yearly evolution of the exit probabilities for a given ﬁrm.
The eﬀects of the explanatory variables (some of which may vary over time) are incorporated
by allowing the hazard function to be inﬂuenced proportionally by the covariates, as suggested
by Cox (1972):
h(m)=exp(βXm)λm,
where Xm is the vector of independent variables observed at m, and β is the corresponding vector
of regression coeﬃcients.
In this model it is assumed that, at each period, the ﬁrm decides whether to continue, to
divest or to shutdown. Technically, this is known as a competing risks model. In this setup, there
are two latent durations: time until divestment and time until closure. The observed duration
is the minimum value between those two latent durations, which are governed by two distinct
hazard functions. Accordingly, when a foreign ﬁrm is observed to close down, this observation
is treated as censored in the divestment equation. Conversely, when divestment is observed, this
observation is treated as censored in the closure equation.
Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood methods. In writing the likelihood function,
a distinction has to be made between ﬁrms that exited and those ﬁrms that survived until the
end of the survey. To the former, we can assign both a lower and an upper interval for the
corresponding durations (interval censored durations). To the latter, all we know is that their
duration exceeds a given limit (censored durations). The derivation of the likelihood function that
accommodates our sampling plan is provided in the appendix, which is available upon request.
Following the discussion of the hypotheses, the following explanatory variables were computed.
Entry Mode: Greenﬁeld — Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if entry is greenﬁeld, 0 if
entry is by acquisition.
Human Capital — Proportion of college graduates in the ﬁrm’s workforce.
Size — Logarithm of the number of employees.
Fully–Owned Subsidiaries — Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if foreign capital has a
100% stake in the company, 0 otherwise.
Majority Joint–Ventures — Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the foreign capital’s
stake in the company is greater or equal to 50% but less than 100%, 0 otherwise.
Limited Liability — Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm is a limited liability
company, 0 otherwise.
Plants — Logarithm of the number of plants operated by the ﬁrm.
Diversiﬁcation — 1 minus the Herﬁndahl index of ﬁrm specialization. The shares of the ﬁrm’s
activities in diﬀerent industries were used to compute this index.
Concentration — Herﬁndahl index of industry concentration.
Scale Economies — Logarithm of the estimate of the Minimum Eﬃcient Scale in the industry,
computed as suggested by Lyons (1980).
Entry — Share of the employment in new ﬁrms in total employment in the industry.
8Industry Growth — Growth rate of industry employment, computed as the diﬀerence in the
logarithms of the employment in the industry in two consecutive years..
Foreign Presence — Share of industry employment in foreign owned ﬁrms.
With the exception of Greenﬁeld, which refers to the conditions at the time of entry, all
variables are time-varying. That is, they may assume diﬀerent values over the lifespan of ﬁrms. In
some cases, these variables reﬂect post-entry decisions, in others they simply reﬂect the evolution
of the environment. As we observe ﬁrms on an annual basis, we are able to measure all of these
variables annually. Our empirical model assumes the most recent observations of these variables
to be the determinants of the exit decisions, that is, we specify exit between moment t−1 and t
as a function of the independent variables observed at moment t − 1.
Sample
Our sample includes 1033 foreign ﬁrms, which entered during the period 1983-89, which were
identiﬁed using the procedures previously discussed. The sample is described in Table 1.
insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 shows that almost 60% of our entrants are greenﬁeld entrants. Almost one half of
the total number of entrants are fully-owned by foreign owners while, among the remaining,
majority owned ﬁrms are slightly more than minority holdings. The vast majority of our foreign
entrants are established as limited liability ﬁrms, only 8% operating under unlimited liability. On
average, entrants employ 57 persons, of which around 10% hold a college degree (the employment
ﬁgure cannot be read from the table, as the size variable is in logarithms). Most ﬁrms operate
a single establishment at the time of entry, but a signiﬁcant number (175) operate more than
one, resulting in an average of 1.64 per ﬁrm (as with size, the ﬁgures reported in the table are
in logarithms). The subsidiaries in our sample tend to be relatively specialized as well, and
the diversiﬁcation index is rather small. The statistics on the industry variables presented in
Table 1 are less straightforward to interpret than the data on ﬁrm variables, as these averages
refer to industries but come from a sample of ﬁrms. For completeness Table 1 also presents the
correlations between the independent variables.
Patterns of Exit
Figure 2 plots the failure rates over the ﬁrst years after entry, that is, the proportion of ﬁrms
that have already exited by a given year. In the ﬁrst plot, the failure rates for the whole set of
foreign entrants is displayed. It is clear that the two types of exit display quite identical levels
and a rather similar pattern over time. While exit by ﬁrm closure experiences an average yearly
rate of 5.9% over the period, the corresponding rate for divestiture is 5.7%. The timing of the
two types of exit seems to be diﬀerent, however. Exit by divestiture is lower than exit by closure
during the ﬁrst years, but it increases at such a pace that it is greater than exit by divestiture in
the ﬁfth year.
9insert Figure 2 about here
The distinction between types of entrants produces more contrasting results. For example,
while for greenﬁeld entrants the probability of closure is always greater than that of divestment,
the opposite result holds (at least from the second year onwards) for acquisition entrants. Al-
though for greenﬁeld entrants this result changes at the eighth year, there is no reason to make
a strong case based on this single ﬁgure. One should keep in mind that our estimates for the
last year are produced using the survivors of a single cohort. Those correspond to a very small
number of observations, and thus the estimates are much less precise. Moreover, comparing the
two plots, one also sees that while acquisition entrants face a higher probability of divestment
than do greenﬁeld ones, these experience a higher probability of closure.
The split of the sample according to the type of ownership arrangement is also instructive.
For majority and fully-owned subsidiaries, the probability of closure is always lower than that of
exit by divestment (again this changes at the eighth year for fully-owned subsidiaries). However,
the evolution of these probabilities over time displays a rather similar pattern. In contrast, during
the ﬁrst year, minority holdings are less likely to be divested than closed. However, in subsequent
years their probability of being divested increases quite dramatically, and the evolution of the
two probabilities is quite disparate. As a consequence, after the third year, these ﬁrms experience
a much higher probability of divestment than majority and fully-owned subsidiaries do.
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of our empirical model for the two modes of
foreign exit. For each exit mode the second column excludes includes those variables which
were not statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst column, thus constituting our preferred parsimonious
speciﬁcation.
insert Table 2 about here
The results indicate that the determinants of exit are diﬀerent for the two destinations. Most
variables attract opposite signs in the two equations or are signiﬁcant in only one. One variable
(Human Capital), however, is an unsurprising exception. The proportion of college graduates in
the labor force exerts a sizeable negative eﬀect upon the exit decision in both equations. This
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly associated with lower failure rates for both types of exit, which indicates
that the extent of ownership advantages (broadly considered) determines the decision to leave
the country.
On the contrary, the entry mode exerts an opposite eﬀect on ﬁrm closure and capital divesti-
ture. Greenﬁeld entrants are more likely than acquisitions to be closed, but they are less likely
to be sold, although the statistical signiﬁcance of this latter eﬀect is only marginal. From the
estimated coeﬃcients associated with Greenﬁeld in Table 2, one can estimate that the conditional
probability of closure is 30% higher for greenﬁeld entrants than for acquisition ones, while the
10conditional probability of divestment is 15% lower. These discrete rate of change in the probabil-
ity of exit is simply calculated by exp(ˆ β) − 1, where (ˆ β) is the corresponding instantaneous rate
displayed in Table 2. This conﬁrms our hypothesis that the acquisition of an ongoing business
reﬂects the existence of some business-speciﬁc advantage, which makes it less likely to shut down.
On the other hand, the fact that it has been acquired, also signals that the business is not owner
speciﬁc to any great extent, which makes it more likely to be sold.
The ownership structure and internal organization seems to aﬀect mostly the likelihood of
divestiture rather than closure. The coeﬃcients of both Majority Joint-Venture and Fully-Owned
Subsidiaries are negative in the ﬁrm closure equation, which indicates that these ownership
arrangements experience a lower probability of failure than does the omitted category, minor-
ity holdings. The coeﬃcient associated with Majority Joint-Venture in the capital divestiture
equation is, however, greater (in absolute values) than the one associated with Fully-Owned Sub-
sidiaries. This suggests that the probability of divestiture is higher for fully-owned ﬁrms than it is
for majority holdings, which is contrary to our expectations, but the diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The legal form variables have the expected signs. In the ﬁrm closure equation, the omitted
category (unlimited liability) is the most likely type of ﬁrm to be closed, the probability of being
shut down varying inversely with the complexity of the legal form. In the capital divestiture
equation, the opposite result holds, reﬂecting the greater diﬃculty inherent in selling an unlimited
liability business.
Firm size is clearly signiﬁcant in the closure, but not in the divestiture equation. This indicates
that it is not the amount of money invested that deters divestment by foreign ﬁrms; rather, the
size of the ﬁrm seems to summarize a number of relevant characteristics that aﬀect their ability
to compete and survive.
The last comment on the eﬀects of ﬁrm variables goes to the variables reﬂecting internal
organization. Firms with a larger number of plants are less likely to be sold, but after controlling
for the number of plants, the coeﬃcient associated with ﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation is not signiﬁcant.
With respect to industry variables, the overall impression is that industry structure matters
for the survival of ﬁrms, but not for capital divestiture. However, concentration does not capture
the industry eﬀect. Rather, the minimum eﬃcient scale and the entry rate in the industry are
the two variables which come out to be important. Foreign presence in the industry is the only
variable that exerts a similar eﬀect on the two modes of foreign capital exit. Foreign ﬁrms are
more likely to survive and to remain foreign owned in those industries which were already more
heavily populated by foreign ﬁrms. This is not surprising, since foreign ﬁrm presence signals the
existence of location conditions that attract foreign ownership.
A ﬁnal comment goes to the evolution of the probabilities of exit over time. As an outcome of
our estimation procedures, we obtain estimates of the baseline hazard parameters, which measure
the probability of closure/divestiture at each moment. Figures 3 depicts such estimates for a ﬁrm
with average characteristics and compares them with the estimates obtained without controlling
for the characteristics of ﬁrms. For computing the estimates reported here, we have used our
preferred speciﬁcations in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2. For making both sets of estimates
comparable, in both cases the estimates are reported as if the overall conditions of the economy
were kept constant. That is, in both cases the estimates are obtained when one particular annual
dummy is set to one and the others to zero. The reported estimates are for the case where the
1987 dummy is set to one.
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Two substantive comments are in line here. First, as a consequence of the ﬂexibility in our
estimation procedure, our estimated baseline hazard rates conform quite closely to the observed
pattern (that is, the estimates without covariates). Second, the evolution of baseline hazard
rates appear to be very diﬀerent for the two types of exit. While the parameters of the closure
equation display a decreasing pattern over time, reﬂecting the learning process that follows entry,
the parameters of the capital divestiture are remarkably constant, except at the second year,
when it peaks. In reading Figure 3, we should remember that the hazard rate in the last year is
estimated with a very small number of observations and being, therefore, estimated with much
less precision. Accordingly, we should not put much emphasis on the fact that the hazard rate
for the divestment in this year is quite out of line with the previous ones. However, despite these
apparently divergent patterns of exit over time, a comparison of the estimated baselines against
the hypothesis of a constant baseline over the period, does not allow one to reject the null in any
of the equations.
Conclusion
This workcontributes to the literature on the survival of foreign owned ﬁrms by analyzing two
alternative forms of exit by foreign entrants. The analysis distinguishes between the closure of
foreign owned businesses and foreign capital divestiture, interpreted here as the end of the match
between ﬁrms and foreign owners. The study shows that the decisions to shutdown and to divest
are governed by diﬀerent factors.
We ﬁnd that the entry mode and the extent of the ﬁrm’s liability exert opposite eﬀects upon
the two modes of exit. Being a greenﬁeld entry increases the likelihood of closure while reducing
that of divestiture. Limited liability ﬁrms are more likely to divest, but less likely to shutdown
than unlimited liability ones. Furthermore, ownership arrangements and organizational structure
aﬀect the likelihood of capital divestment, but have little eﬀect on the survival of ﬁrms. Only the
human capital in the ﬁrm and the previous presence of foreign ﬁrms exert a similar eﬀect upon
both modes of exit. Moreover, while the probability of closure seems to decline with experience,
the probability of divestment is roughly constant over time.
Our results provide important insights for managers considering entry into a foreign market,
by showing to what extent the decisions taken during the entry and post-entry periods may aﬀect
the likelihood of exiting by one and the other exit modes. In attempting to learn from our study,
however, managers should be careful in drawing prescriptive measures. One should keep in mind
that, in many circumstances, exit is the best decision, if that option is available. Actions that
create that option may thus be valuable, especially if the ﬁrm has little experience with inter-
national operations in general, or with that country in particular. In our context, this suggests
that ﬁrms with little previous experience should avoid making highly speciﬁc investments, as this
may decrease the chances of ﬁnding a suitable buyer, enabling them to leave the country.
The results of our study can also be of interest from an economic policy perspective. Some
countries have policies of attracting foreign direct investment. Such policies are pursued in the
belief that foreign investment creates spillovers to the rest of the economy and, therefore, will
be the more valuable the longer the foreign ﬁrm remains in the country. Our study shows
that greenﬁeld investments are likely to have a longer lasting presence in the host country than
12investments by acquisition of ongoing concerns, which may lead policy makers to handle the two
types of investment diﬀerently.
For scholars interested in the survival of foreign owned ﬁrms, our workcreates new challenges.
Most of the literature on survival in foreign countries implicitly identiﬁes exit with the failure of
the foreign subsidiary. However, exit may be due to reasons other than failure. In the ﬁnance
literature, the acquisition of companies followed by its reorganization and subsequent sell-oﬀ
has been clearly identiﬁed as a means of making a proﬁt (Kaplan and Weisbach 1989). In the
context of international business, Tsetekos and Gombola (1992) and Ghertman (1988) noted that
divestment of foreign subsidiaries does not necessarily indicate problems in the subsidiary, nor
in the parent company. Rather, it may be due to strategic re-orientation of the parent company
and to the perception that the subsidiary no longer ﬁts with the parent. All of these reasons
suggest that the two modes of exit may be associated with diﬀerent pre-exit performances of the
exitors.
Measuring the performance of subsidiaries of foreign companies is tricky, not least because
of the problems associated with transfer pricing. However, evaluating the extent to which the
performance of these two types of exitors diﬀers in the pre-exit period is crucial for knowing
the magnitude of the costs involved in the trade-oﬀ between the adequacy of the productive
facilities to the foreign ﬁrm and the speciﬁcity of capital, which leads to the subsequent increased
diﬃculty in exiting from the country. Our understanding of the entry and post-entry performance
in foreign countries would beneﬁt greatly from such knowledge.
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18Table 1: Independent Variables at Entry (N=1033)
AverageStandard
Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Entry Mode: Greenfield 0.59  -     -   
(2) College 0.11 0.20 0.14  -   
(3) Size 2.61 1.61 -0.38 -0.27  -   
(4) Plants 0.20 0.53 -0.24 -0.11 0.46  -   
(5) Diversification 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.06 -0.25 -0.43  -   
(6) Limited Liability 0.92  -    0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.02 0.00  -   
(7) Majority Joint-Ventures 0.32  -    0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.15  -   
(8) Fully-Owned Subsidiaries 0.47  -    0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.24 -0.65  -   
(9) MES 3.51 1.04 -0.09 -0.16 0.44 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04  -   
(10) Concentration 0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02  -   
(11) Entry 0.07 0.08 0.19 0.11 -0.11 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.21 0.21  -   
(12) Industry Growth 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.54  -   
(13) Foreign Presence 0.15 0.17 -0.05 0.09 0.18 0.13 -0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.37 0.13 0.15Table 2: The Determinants of Exit by Divestment and Closure (N = 3766).
Capital Divestiture Firm Closure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Mode: Greenﬁeld -0.151 -0.162 0.278 0.266
(0.147) (0.147) (0.160) (0.160)
Human Capital -0.922 -0.919 -0.896 -0.908
(0.505) (0.503) (0.384) (0.383)
Size -0.054 -0.059 -0.479 -0.487
(0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.063)
Plants -0.322 -0.295 -0.437 0.072
(0.183) (0.170) (0.233) (0.215)
Diversiﬁcation -0.372 -0.266
(0.997) (1.328)
Limited Liability 0.918 0.916 0.135 -0.453
(0.424) (0.424) (0.204) (0.233)
Majority Joint-Ventures -0.513 -0.506 0.062 0.148
(0.186) (0.186) (0.200) (0.203)
Fully-Owned Subsidiaries -0.281 -0.283 -0.365 0.060
(0.171) (0.171) (1.244) (0.200)
Scale Economies -0.051 -0.046 0.207 0.214
(0.084) (0.084) (0.078) (0.081)
Concentration 0.468 0.707
(0.633) (0.545)
Entry 0.172 0.169 2.773 3.122
(1.560) (1.570) (0.928) (0.893)
Industry Growth 0.167 0.108
(0.128) (0.172)
Foreign Presence -1.669 -1.601 -0.755 -0.588
(0.517) (0.518) (0.469) (0.462)
χ
2 99.234 97.337 145.773 143.892
Notes: Figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Annual time dummies
and age dummies (not reported in the table) were also included in all regressions.
20Appendix: Data and Methodology
Data Source
Our data were obtained from a survey conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment
(Quadros de Pessoal hereafter QP). This survey has been conducted every year since 1982, cov-
ering all ﬁrms with wage earners in Portugal. There are no other regular statistics which aim
to be as comprehensive as this source. However, for manufacturing the Census of Manufacturers
conducted in 1984 provides a natural benchmarkagainst which the survey representativeness can
be checked. Comparison of these two sources indicates that QP records a larger number of ﬁrms
in all employment classes than the Census itself, except in the class of ﬁrms employing less than
5 persons. There is no a priori reason to believe that QP may be less comprehensive in other
sectors than in manufacturing and we are thus led to conclude that, except for the self-employed
(which are not our concern here), our source is a highly comprehensive one.
The survey has a longitudinal dimension, i. e. ﬁrms are identiﬁed through a unique number
which allows ﬁrms to be followed over time. With respect to this characteristic, the crucial point
for our analysis is to be sure that these numbers permit the identiﬁcation of true entries and exits,
rather than false movements due to miscoding. Of course, with such a large database, one can
never be sure that no errors are committed, and we tookspecial care to minimize the number
of false entries and exits that were included in our sample, through a number of procedures
described in the following section.
What makes this data source really unique and particularly valuable from the point of view
of the analysis of foreign entry and exit is that, among other data, the survey records the share of
equity held by non-residents. Taken together with its longitudinal characteristic, this allows us to
compute measures of entry of foreign capital and to establish the longevity of these investments
in Portugal.
All of these characteristics make this data source an excellent one for studying changes in
foreign capital participation in Portugal, in particular entry and survival of foreign capital and
foreign owned companies.
Computing Duration Data
We identiﬁed changes in foreign capital participation with a three step procedure. First, we
identiﬁed all ﬁrms which held foreign capital in at least one year from 1983 to 1989 and which
did not have foreign capital in the previous year. This enabled us to date the moment of entry
of foreign capital. Second, we searched for the existence of the ﬁrm itself in the year before
entry in order to be able to classify foreign entry as acquisition versus greenﬁeld. This could be
easily done because ﬁrms’ identiﬁers are numbers supplied sequentially when ﬁrms ﬁrst report
to the survey. Identiﬁcation of new ﬁrms can thus be achieved by comparing ﬁrms’ identiﬁers
with the highest identiﬁcation number in the ﬁle in the previous year. Finally, the last step
was the establishment of the life span of foreign capital. For this we had to be able to identify
the moment in which the foreign participation ceased. As previously discussed we are interested
in distinguishing two alternatives: foreign ﬁrm closure, where the foreign owned ﬁrm ceases its
operations, and foreign capital divestiture, where the ﬁrm continues to operate, but no longer
with foreign capital participation. To identify the moment of divestiture we searched for the ﬁrst
year when the ﬁrm reported foreign participation below 10%, while for identifying closure we
searched for the moment when the ﬁrm ceased to report to the survey.
21Figure 4: The Sampling Plan
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With such a large database, there are inevitably some coding errors in the ﬁles. To be on the
safe side in computing life spans with such a data base, we performed some data editing upon
the original data ﬁle. Speciﬁcally, some ﬁrms may fail to report data on equity participation.
We assumed that all ﬁrms with missing data in these ﬁelds are private domestic ﬁrms and thus
they were not included in the analysis. However, in order to be able to classify an equity change
as foreign divestiture we required that, when a previously foreign owned company reported zero
foreign equity there were valid data in the other equity ﬁelds, i. e., that the percentage of all the
other participations added up to one hundred.
Similarly, we performed additional controls before classifying a ﬁrm closure. Namely, we
required that a ﬁrm be absent from the ﬁle for at least two years in order to be classiﬁed as a
closure. A temporary exit may occur for a number of reasons other than cessation of activity, a
likely reason being that the survey form was not received in the Ministry of Employment before
the date when the recording operations were closed. Accordingly, we recoded the status of ﬁrms
which were absent from the ﬁles for just one year. Firms that were in the ﬁles in years t − 1
and t + 1 were considered to be active in year t even if they were not actually in the ﬁle and
the ﬁrm’s record was amended for that year. Therefore, for a closure to be recorded in t − 1a
ﬁrm had to be absent from the ﬁle in t and t + 1. For this reason, in our subsequent analysis
we use data only until 1990, although our data ﬁles go until 1992. Data from 1992 is used only
to checkthe presence of the ﬁrm in 1991 and the last year for which we can identify an exit is
1990. Nevertheless, the information on 1991 is used to distinguish between complete and censored
durations among those operating in 1990.
Figure 4 represents the sampling plan from this survey and illustrates this point. The left
panel displays the longevity of foreign capital, represented on a calendar time, while the right
panel presents the corresponding measured durations. For expositional convenience, only an
arbitrary single spell is depicted for each of the seven cohorts of ﬁrms (1983 to 1989).
The horizontal lines depicted in the left panel represent the longevity of foreign capital since
the moment of entry until the moment of divestment (or, alternatively, the moment of ﬁrm
closure), while the vertical lines indicate the ﬁrst and last surveys in which a ﬁrm is observed.
22Of course, these dates are not the exact dates of start and exit, as it is clear from the fact that
the horizontal lines may cross the vertical ones.
The diagram also makes it clear that duration is measured with some imprecision, since we
are unable to date the starting and ending moments exactly. However, since we can trackthe
presence of the ﬁrm on a yearly basis we are able to deﬁne the proper limits of the duration
interval, which are depicted in the left panel. In this ﬁgure, the solid lines represent the lower
limit of the duration intervals, whereas the dotted lines represent the width of the interval. Thus,
the right end of the dotted lines gives the upper limit of the duration interval.
If a ﬁrm is observed in a single survey, its duration interval is recorded as being delimited
between 0 and 2 (in our example, the duration labeled e), if it is observed in two surveys its
duration is recorded as [1,3] (that labeled g), and so on. This last life span is observed in
1990, but not in 1991. Its exit time is properly established in 1990 and the duration is recorded
complete. In contrast, durations a, d, and f are also observed in 1990 but are once again observed
in 1991. Therefore, all we know is that their exit time is beyond 1991. We marked the end of
these observations’ duration with a star in the right panel of Figure 4, and treat them as censored
in the analysis. Our statistical models will pay particular attention to this fact.
Finally, the ﬁgure makes it clear that whereas the ﬁrms from the 1983 cohort can reach a
maximum of eight years of duration, the ones from the 1989 cohort can reach, at most, two years.
An obvious consequence to be kept in mind is that, while the exit rates for the ﬁrst and second
years are estimated using data from the seven cohorts, the subsequent rates are estimated using
fewer cohorts. In particular, our estimates for the exit rate after eight years is produced solely
with data from the 1983 cohort.
Limitations of the data
The database has also limitations that should be made clear. First, we do not know the
identity of the foreign owners. This is unfortunate because it prevents us from using the parents’
characteristics to explain the exit of subsidiaries, and because we are not able to identify the
sale of a foreign equity participation by one foreign ﬁrm to another. We cross-checked for the
occurrence of such movements with the raw data from the Balance of Payments computed by
the Bankof Portugal. The data are not strictly comparable because the Balance of Payment ﬁle
does not record the share of foreign ownership at each moment but, rather, the transactions of
foreign currency which were actually performed by each foreign investor. Moreover, these data
are available for the period 1990-1992 only, and therefore do not coincide with the period we
are analyzing. We used these data for computing the number of cases where a foreign investor
divests totally or partially from a continuing domestic ﬁrm, and another foreign investor invests
in the same ﬁrm during the same year. We found that such simultaneous divestment–investment,
occurs only in 5% of the total number of cases of divestment. Therefore, we conclude that this
is not a serious problem in our analysis.
Another potential limitation of our data set is that we cannot tell mergers from true exits.
What typically happens when one of such movements occurs is that one of the identiﬁers of the
ﬁrms involved in the merger is transmitted to the resulting ﬁrm, while the others disappear, and
are counted as exits in our data. There are no published data on mergers for Portugal, and it is
not easy to have an accurate estimate of the number of mergers that occur every year. To obtain
a crude estimate of the importance of mergers, we used the Firms Register ﬁle. This ﬁle records
data on all ﬁrms that existed when it was created (1988) or have been created since that date.
For each ﬁrm, only the most current information is maintained. This is not really a problem for
ﬁrms that were liquidated (including mergers), since the last information available for these ﬁrms
23is that they were liquidated.
Data on liquidations have two problems, however. The ﬁrst problem is that there is no
information on the date of the liquidation/merger. Therefore, the best we can do is to calculate
the number of ﬁrms that merged during the period 1988-1997 and compare this number to the
number of liquidations during the same period. The second problem is that most businesses never
de-register, even if they cease operations. The number of registered liquidations is, therefore, an
underestimate of the number of exits. In fact, the number of total liquidations during the whole
period is only 2.5% of the stockof registered ﬁrms, while additions to the stockof registered
businesses vary between 5% and 10% per year. Underestimation of exit ﬂows is not likely to be a
problem for limited liability ﬁrms, which constitute the majority of our sample. The proportion
of such ﬁrms which were liquidated is about 20%. As limited liability ﬁrms are typically much
larger than the average business, and the conventional wisdom is that size is negatively related
to exit, the ﬁgure above suggests that underestimation of exit is less important than it is for
the whole set of ﬁrms. Underestimation, likewise, is not a problem for ﬁrms that undergo a
change in their legal status, such as those that merge. By deﬁnition, in order for a change in
status to produce legal eﬀects, ﬁrms have to register it. Keeping in mind the caveats above, we
divided the number of mergers by the total number of liquidations for limited liability ﬁrms. Our
calculations indicate that mergers are only 2.2% of the registered liquidations. Given that the
numerator is measured accurately and the denominator is an underestimate of total exits, our
ﬁgure is an upper bound for the proportion of mergers in total exits. We, therefore, maintain
that our inability to trace mergers in our data set is not likely to greatly bias our results.
Statistical Model
For analyzing in detail the time pattern of the exit of ﬁrms and of foreign capital divest-
ment, we rely on statistical models belonging to a class of models known as duration analysis
or event history analysis. Conventional multivariate statistical approaches such as linear regres-
sion methods are ill-suited to properly analyze data when the phenomena under scrutiny is the
time elapsed within a state (e.g., activity) before a transition occurs to a diﬀerent state (e.g.,
shutdown). This is because at the end of the survey period the duration is still incomplete for a
number of observations (in our case, because a number of ﬁrms are still operating). Furthermore,
since we are interested in depicting the evolution of the exit rates as time proceeds, the use of
standard binary choice models is also inadequate.
The key concept in duration analysis is the hazard rate. The hazard rate gives the probability
that an observation exits within a particular time interval, given that it survived until then. In
our context, we will workwith two distinct hazard rates, corresponding to the two types of exit
we are interested in.
Given that with our sampling plan we can only assign to ﬁrms discrete durations, we proceed
by dividing the time axis into eight intervals, corresponding to our eight measured durations, and
deﬁning the hazard rate [h(m)] for the mth interval as the probability of exiting during the mth
interval, conditional upon having survived until then.
Rather than imposing a parametric functional form for the hazard function, a simple ﬂexible
hazard model (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980) was employed
h(m)=λm m =1 ,2,...,80 <λ m < 1,
where λm is just the exit rate for the interval m. Thus, the sequence from λ1 to λ8 exhibits the
yearly evolution of the exit probabilities for a given ﬁrm.
The eﬀects of the explanatory variables (some of which may vary over time) are incorporated
by allowing the hazard function to be inﬂuenced proportionally by the covariates, as suggested
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by Cox (1972):
h(m)=exp(βXm)λm m =1 ,2,...,8,
where Xm is the vector of independent variables observed at m, and β is the corresponding vector
of regression coeﬃcients. To facilitate the interpretation of the parameters, the previous function
can be rewritten in a linear form as:
log h(m)=log(λm)+βXm m =1 ,2,...,8.
making clear that the eﬀect of a unit increase in a covariate Xj is to increase h(m)b y1 0 0 βj
percent.
The hazard model is diagrammatically sketched in Figure 5. The graph represents the hazard
functions for two ﬁrms that diﬀer with respect to characteristic X. For the sake of simplicity we
assume that X is a binary variable that indicates the presence of a riskof failure, for example
that the ﬁrm is fully foreign owned versus joint venture. With the necessary adaptations, all
of this also applies to continuous variables. The solid line represents the absence of a failure
risk (called the baseline hazard function) and the dotted line marks the presence of such risk.
The comparison of the two hazard functions shows that the eﬀect of the regressor is to increase
proportionally the odds of failure at each time interval. The assumed proportionality implies
that the ratio of the hazard rates for the two ﬁrms remains constant along the time span, which
is the reason for calling this a Proportional Hazards Model.
Riskfactors may, however, change over time. For example, ﬁrms may change their legal form
and an earlier joint venture may become totally foreign controlled. As we are able to update the
riskindicators every year, we incorporate such information in the statistical model. Going back
to Figure 5, suppose, for example, that after a number of periods the ﬁrm value for X changes
from 1 to 0. This change would be represented simply by the displacement of the hazard function
for that ﬁrm from the dotted to the solid line starting at the time where that change occurred.
Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood methods. In writing the likelihood function,
a distinction has to be made between ﬁrms that exited and those ﬁrms that survived until the
end of the survey. To the former, we can assign both a lower and an upper interval for the
corresponding durations (interval censored durations). To the latter, all we know is that their
duration exceeds a given limit (censored durations). The derivation of the likelihood function
25that accommodates our sampling plan is provided below.
This statistical methodology applies to both the duration of the ﬁrm and the duration of the
foreign capital. In order to separate the determinants of these two diﬀerent exit modes a clear
distinction has to be made between a ﬁrm closure and a foreign capital divestment. Accordingly,
when a foreign ﬁrm closes down, this observation is treated as censored in the divestment equation.
Conversely, when divestment is observed, we treat this observation as censored in the closure
equation.
In summary, maximum likelihood methods were employed to estimate a simple ﬂexible hazard
model that accommodates the grouped nature of the duration data, distinguishes between two
competing risks of failure, and incorporates time-varying explanatory variables.
The hazard rate can be formally expressed as
h(m)=P(Exit at m|Survival to m) m =1 ,2,...,8, or
h(m)=P(Exit at m)/P(Survival to m) m =1 ,2,...,8 or, even more speciﬁcally, as
h(m)=f(m)/(1 − F(m)) ,
where f(m) denotes the discrete probability mass function at the time interval m, and 1−F(m)
gives the probability that a ﬁrm survived up to the upper limit of the m interval, that is, gives
the survival function S(m).




Thus, the likelihood contribution for a ﬁrm which exits at interval m equals S(m)−S(m−1).
Alternatively, the contribution for a ﬁrm whose duration is censored at m is given by S(m − 1).
In general, the likelihood function for ﬁrm i can be expressed as
Li =
8
m=1[(Si(m − 1) − Si(m))δi(Si(m − 1))1−δi]δmi,
where δi identiﬁes an uncensored duration and δmi equals 1 if the ﬁrm’s duration falls into the
m interval, and 0 otherwise.





m=1 δmilog[1 − e−exp(βXmi)λm] −
8
m=2 δmi
m−1
j=1 exp(βXji)λj}.
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